Education Funding in Maine in Light of Zelman and Locke: Too Much Play in the Joints? by Lavigne, Sarah M.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 59 
Number 2 Symposium: Closing in on Open 
Science: 
Trends in Intellectual Property & Scientific 
Research 
Article 12 
June 2007 
Education Funding in Maine in Light of Zelman and Locke: Too 
Much Play in the Joints? 
Sarah M. Lavigne 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, 
Religion Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sarah M. Lavigne, Education Funding in Maine in Light of Zelman and Locke: Too Much Play in the 
Joints?, 59 Me. L. Rev. 511 (2007). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol59/iss2/12 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 511 2007
EDUCATION FUNDING IN MAINE IN LIGHT OF 
ZELMAN AND LOCKE: TOO MUCH PLAY IN THE 
JOINTS? 
Sarah M Lavigne 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. EDUCATION FUNDING: PLAY IN THE JOINTS OR GAPING HOLES? 
A. The History of the Establishment Clause in Education Funding-
Everson to Agostini 
B. The Proper Reading of the Establishment Clause 
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
D. Locke v. Davey 
III. APPLICATION OF ZELMAN AND LOCKE 
A. Bush v. Holmes 
B. Gary S. v. Manchester School District 
IV. MAINE'S APPROACH 
A. Bagley v. Raymond School Department 
B. Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education 
C. Anderson v. Town of Durham 
V. THE VIABILITY OF MAINTAINING CURRENT POLICIES IN MAINE 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 512 2007
512 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2 
EDUCATION FUNDING IN MAINE IN LIGHT OF 
ZELMAN AND LOCKE: TOO MUCH PLAY IN THE 
JOINTS? 
Sarah M Lavigne· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the countervailing directives 
of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause for decades. One area in 
which this battle has been particularly contentious is the issue of public funding of 
religious schools. On one hand, opponents argue that such funding is an impermissible 
co-mingling of church and state, thereby violating the Establishment Clause. 
Meanwhile, proponents of public funding ofreligious schools argue that, to withhold 
funding from religious schools would place a burden on those wishing to send their 
children to religious schools, thereby impermissibly preventing individuals from 
practicing their faith and violating the Free Exercise Clause. 
In two recent cases involving public funding of religious education, Locke v. 
Davey1 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,2 the Court arrived at outcomes that seem at 
first glance to be as difficult to reconcile as the Religion Clauses themselves; Locke 
resulted in the lack of public funding for religious education, while in Zelman the 
receipt of public funds by religious schools was declared constitutional. The Zelman 
opinion, though, was primarily a pronouncement that states may fund religious schools 
if they affirmatively choose to do so, while the Locke opinion articulated that a state 
cannot be forced to fund religious education if it chooses not to do so. The Court, 
unfortunately, did not clarify where the first principle left off and where the second 
principle picked up. 
In Zelman, a divided Court upheld a program in Ohio that allowed Cleveland 
parents to remove their children from the public school system, send them to private 
schools-both secular and religious-and have that private school tuition paid for in 
part by vouchers distributed by the government. 3 Finding that the program did not 
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court highlighted the fact that 
the Cleveland public school system was, by all accounts, woefully under-serving the 
students ofCleveland. 4 The Court also found important the fact that public funds were 
Id. 
* J.D., 2007, University of Maine School of Law. 
I. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
2. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
3. Id. at 662-63. 
4. Id. at 644. The Court observed that: 
Only I in IO ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination, and students at all 
levels performed at a dismal rate compared with students in other Ohio public schools. 
More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before graduation. 
Of those students who managed to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to 
graduate. Of those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels 
comparable to their counterparts in other cities. 
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not going directly to religious institutions, but rather were being diverted to parents, 
who then were free to choose to pass those funds along to pay for tuition at religious 
schools.5 
Two years later, in Locke, the Court upheld a Washington state postsecondary 
scholarship program that expressly excluded from eligibility any student who was 
pursuing a degree in devotional theology. 6 Even though, as in Zelman, the government 
funding in Locke was diverted through an individual whose private choice would have 
resulted in the funding ofreligious education, the Court issued an anti-funding ruling 
and held that the state of Washington could constitutionally withhold fundtng.7 
The two cases look at first glance as though their outcomes are in opposition. 
Locke and Zelman do, however, have important distinguishing characteristics. First, 
the funding at issue in Zelman paid for education that was both religious and secular 
in nature, while Locke involved funding of purely religious education in the form of 
ministerial training. 8 This allowed the Locke Court to remain focused-as is their 
responsibility-on the constitutional principles implicit in the Establishment Clause 
and in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The majority in Zelman, however, became 
distracted by extra-constitutional factors, such as Cleveland's failing schools, perhaps 
because the religious elements of parochial elementary and high school education 
appear more innocuous at first glance than does postsecondary ministerial training. 
Second, the Court's analysis in Locke focused on a provision of the Washington 
Constitution, 9 which includes a more strictly-worded notion of the separation of church 
and state. 10 The reasoning of Zelman, on the other hand, was limited to the U.S. 
Constitution. These holdings imply that establishment and free exercise concerns will 
be weighed differently in each state, raising questions of federalism and consistency. 
The Establishment Clause is a protection that should be emphatically maintained for 
all citizens of the United States, regardless of their state of residence. In fact, the 
5. Id. at 652-53. Rehnquist stated that "the program challenged here is a program of true private 
choice" and went on to assert that "[t]here are no 'financial incentive[s ]' that 'ske[ w ]' the program toward 
religious schools .... The program here in fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with 
private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third 
the assistance given to magnet schools." Id. at 653-54 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986)). These statements do nothing to negate the constitutional problem 
that religious schools are in fact receiving public funds. Furthermore, the manner in which Rehnquist 
framed his statements ("private schools receiving only half the government assistance given to community 
schools") entirely contradicts his statements regarding diversion of funds through parents, and makes his 
"indirectness" argument ring hollow. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
6. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 n.9. 
7. Id. 
8. Mr. Davey did participate in mixed secular and religious education, in that he attended a religiously 
affiliated college. Locke, 540 U.S. at 717. However, the only aspect of his education that was in dispute 
in the case was that which was directed solely at ministerial training. Id. at 718. 
9. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 states, in relevant part: 
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, 
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person 
or property on account of religion .... No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any 
religious establishment. 
I 0. Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 ("[llhe differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more stringent 
line than that drawn by the United States Constitution .... "). 
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Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 11 specifically declared that the 
Establishment Clause was to apply to the individual states. 12 
The Zelman and Locke decisions, juxtaposed both in time and in subject matter, 
indicate that the future of jurisprudence of public funding for religious schools will be 
murky at best. The Court has seemingly conveyed that there is a standard to be 
used-that of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution-except when one of fifty 
potential other standards might be used-those of the various state constitutions. 
Taking into account the fact that some states have statutes on point in addition to or 
instead of constitutional provisions, the matter becomes even more confusing. This 
area of the law has the potential to leave educators, legislators, and judges in every 
state wondering about the permissibility of proposed programs and those already in 
effect. 
This Comment will examine the Zelman and Locke decisions, the flaws present in 
the Court's reasoning of the two cases, and the resulting uncertainty left in their wake. 
The Comment will then examine a sample of recent lower court decisions regarding 
education funding to show how other states have dealt with the Zelman-Locke 
confusion. Finally, the Comment will consider Maine's handling of this confusing area 
of the law. 13 
II. EDUCATION FuNDING: PLAY IN THE JOINTS OR GAPING HOLES? 
Although both the Free Exercise 14 and Establishment Clauses 15 have been invoked 
by various plaintiffs in education funding cases, 16 the issue of whether government 
dollars may be used to fund religious schools more squarely implicates the 
Establishment Clause because the issue is whether the government may sponsor 
religion. 17 Lack of funding of religious schools does not hinder individuals in their 
I I. 330 U.S. I (I 947). 
12. The Court stated: 
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was designed 
forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions of the Court prior 
to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. The broad 
meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its 
decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action 
abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad 
interpretation to the "establishment of religion" clause. 
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). 
13. Although plaintiffs in various cases have advanced creative arguments such as those based on equal 
protection and free speech claims, this Comment is more narrowly focused on the religion clauses-in 
particular the Establishment Clause-as they relate to religious education funding jurisprudence. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]."). 
15. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion."). 
16. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I (1993); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (I 983); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). 
17. SeeBagleyv.RaymondSch.Dep't, 1999ME60,iJ22, 728A.2d 127, 135-36. TheBagleyCourt 
articulated that: 
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ability to practice religion, and the Free Exercise Clause is therefore not implicated as 
directly as is the Establishment Clause. 18 The mere refusal of the government to 
provide funding does not hinder an individual's ability to practice religion. 19 
In order to make a free exercise argument that would have even a chance at 
success under accepted First Amendment jurisprudence, a plaintiff would have to show 
that sending one's children to a sectarian school is an important aspect of his or her 
faith, and that he or she could not adequately practice such faith otherwise. This 
argument has not arisen in education funding jurisprudence to date;20 even if it did, its 
success would be questionable because the Court has articulated that, while a right 
such as exercising one's religion may be fundamental, the government is not required 
to subsidize a fundamental right. 21 For this reason, while the Free Exercise Clause is 
ofrelevant concern here-that is, both federal and state governmental actors must be 
careful not to infringe on citizens' ability to practice their respective faith, be it 
Judaism, Buddhism, or Atheism 22-most of the in-depth analysis in this area of the law 
has focused on the Establishment Clause. 
A. The History of the Establishment Clause in Education Funding-
Everson to Agostini 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the area of education funding traces back 
to the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education, 23 the first case in which the 
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion 
and from forcing religion, even in subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it. It has 
no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice ofreligion more available 
or easier. It simply does not speak to governmental actions that fail to support religion. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
I 8. The Law Court in Bagley noted that "[i]t is well established that there is no substantial burden 
placed on an individual's free exercise ofreligion where a law or policy merely operates so as to make the 
practice of [the individual's] religious beliefs more expensive." Id. ,r 18, 728 A.2d at 134 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); cf Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,412 (1963)(Douglas, J., concurring). The 
Free Exercise Clause is of concern in education-funding cases because it represents the limit a government 
entity may approach when addressing Establishment Clause concerns. For instance, if a state decided to 
charge families a tax for sending their children to religious schools and paying for that tuition 
independently, or otherwise prevented families from sending their children to religious schools, such state 
action would violate the Free Exercise Clause. A mere refusal of the government to affirmatively fund 
religious education does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
19. The Court "ha[s] held in several contexts that a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise 
ofa fundamental right does not infringe the right .... " Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 
461 U.S. 540,549 (1983). 
20. Although the Plaintiff in Locke did assert that he felt a religious calling to enter the ministry, he did 
not claim that he would otherwise be fundamentally unable to practice his faith. See Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712, 721 (2004). 
21. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 ("This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit ... to a 
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right."). 
22. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,598 (1989) ("Perhaps in the early days of the 
Republic [the religion clauses] were understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity, but today 
they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent 
of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism."') (quoting Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (I 985)) 
(emphasis added). 
23. 330 U.S. I (I 947). 
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Establishment Clause was explicitly applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 24 In Everson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey program 
reimbursing parents for the cost of transporting their children to and from both secular 
and religious private schools. 25 The Court, in upholding the program, articulated a 
clear and strict interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 26 
Two decades later, the Court decided Board of Education v. Allen, 21 in which it 
was found permissible for the State of New York to require public schools to lend 
textbooks to students attending religious schools28 because the benefit involved was 
one to the students rather than to the religious schools.29 The Court highlighted the 
fact that ''the Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the 
benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation .... "30 
From there, the Court's analysis of education funding under the Establishment 
Clause shifted its focus, beginning with Lemon v. Kurtzman. 31 Rather than examining 
the benefit to the public from the program in question, the Court began to look at a 
program's benefit to religious institutions.32 In Lemon, the State of Pennsylvania 
instituted a program whereby private schools, both secular and religious, were 
reimbursed for certain secular expenses.33 The Court struck down the program 34 and 
articulated a new test for determining the. constitutionality of funding under the 
Establishment Clause. 35 The Court announced that, for state action to be permissible 
under the Establishment Clause, it "must have a secular legislative purpose; ... its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
[and] the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion. "36 
The application of the Lemon test, however, has been fraught with instability and 
confusion. Sporadically, the Court has used it to strike down programs involving 
public funding assistance for religious schools. 37 In one of those cases, Committee for 
24. Id. at 8. 
25. Id. at 17. 
26. Id. at 15-16 ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least ... 
[ that] [ n ]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."). One 
commentator noted, "Everson is clear and unyielding in its language[;) ... the Court made a robust 
antiestablishment statement." Virginia Chase Crocker, Note, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: The 
Establishment Clause and the Fight/or School Vouchers, 58 ARK. L. REV. 395,408 (2005). 
27. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
28. Id. at 238. 
29. Id. at 243-44 ("[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit 
is to parents and children, not to schools."). 
30. Id. at 242. 
31. 403U.S.602(1971). 
32. Id. at 615. 
33. Id. at 609. 
34. Id. at 607. 
35. Id. at 612-13. 
36. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
37. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding that programs 
allowing public school teachers to teach certain classes in private religious schools "have the 'primary or 
principal' effect of advancing religion, and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment Clause .... "); 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,363 (1975) ("[T]he direct loan of instructional material and equipment 
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Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 38 the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a New York statute that provided, as a means of offsetting the cost 
of tuition, income tax benefits to the parents of students attending nonpublic 
institutions, including parochial, elementary, and secondary schools. 39 The Court held 
that "[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived 
from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological 
purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid." 40 The 
Nyquist Court went on to imply that aid would be similarly unconstitutional even if 
diverted through an "ingenious plan[] for channeling aid to sectarian schools" through 
parents. 41 
Despite the Court's statements in Nyquist, its application of the Lemon test in other 
cases has resulted in decisions upholding state funding of religious education. 42 At 
times, the Court addressed issues and fact patterns that were similar to those of 
previous cases, only to arrive at seemingly opposite, and therefore confusing, 
outcomes. For instance, in Mueller v. Allen, 43 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute 
that permitted parents to deduct education-related expenses in the computation of their 
state income taxes, regardless of whether their children attended secular or religious 
schools. 44 The Mueller Court, perhaps questionably, attempted to distinguish Nyquist, 
focusing in part on the fact that tax statutes have historically been given a higher 
degree of deference by the courts. 45 Also, in Agostini v. Felton, 46 the Court found it 
permissible for public school teachers to spend time, paid for with government funds, 
teaching in private religious schools. 47 However, in doing so, the Court explicitly 
has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious 
characterofthe schools benefiting .... "); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 794 (1973) (holding that repair grants, tuition reimbursement grants, and tax benefits to parents of 
children attending private religious schools failed the "effect" prong of the Lemon test and were therefore 
unconstitutional). 
38. 413 U.S. 756. 
39. Id. at 764. 
40. Id. at 780. 
41. Id. at 785. 
42. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (I 993)(holding that the salary of sign 
language interpreter in religious school may be paid for with public funds); Witters v. Wash. Dep' t of Servs. 
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a grant to aid blind college student in studying to become 
a pastor); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (allowing state income tax deductions for the cost of 
transportation, materials, and tuition at religious schools). 
43. 463 U.S. 388. 
44. Id. at 391,403. 
45. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-97 n.6. The Mueller Court stated: 
While the economic consequences of the program in Nyquist and that in this case may be 
difficult to distinguish, we have recognized on other occasions that "the form of the [State's 
assistance to parochial schools must be examined] for the light that it casts on the 
substance." The fact that the Minnesota plan embodies a "genuine tax deduction" is thus 
of some relevance, especially given the traditional rule of deference accorded legislative 
classifications in tax statutes. 
Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971)). 
46. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
4 7. Id. The Agostini Court stated: 
We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial 
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overruled its prior holding in Aguilar v. Felton, 48 in which the Court had, twelve years 
earlier, struck down New York City's use of federal money to fund a program under 
which public school teachers had provided instruction and guidance in religious 
schools. 49 
The result of the Court's inconsistency was a collection of rulings that made for 
confusing, unclear precedent. 50 This was, perhaps, caused in part by the Court's 
reluctance to either renounce or adhere to the Lemon test. 51 For instance, in Nyquist, 
the Court indicated that the prongs of the Lemon test should only be "viewed as 
guidelines." 52 Thereafter, the Court has also said in other cases that the Lemon test is 
"no more than [a] helpful signpost[)," 53 and that the Court would not be bound by that 
or any other test. 54 
Rather than either adhering to the Lemon test or simply renouncing it, the Court 
attempted to modify it in Agostini, 55 arguably adding to the confusion surrounding 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for lower courts. 56 The Agostini Court effectively 
condensed the three prongs of the Lemon test into a single "effect" test; the 
entanglement prong became folded into an effect analysis, and the purpose prong was 
instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid under the 
Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools 
by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those 
present here. 
Id. at 234-35. 
Id. 
48. Id. at 235. ("[W]e must acknowledge that Aguilar . .. [is] no longer good law."). 
49. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,414 (1985). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan said: 
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City ofNew York, the program remains 
constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid, 
and to the constitutional principles that they implicate---that neither the State nor Federal 
Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally .... 
50. For example, in one recent case, Justice Thomas lamented, "This case would be easy if the Court 
were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing Establishment Clause 
challenges." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
51. Indeed, the Court recently stated that "[ m Jany of our recent cases simply have not applied the 
Lemon test." Id. at 686 (majority opinion). 
52. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (quoting Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,678 (1971)). 
53. Muellerv. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,394 (1983)(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). 
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness 
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."). 
55. Crocker, supra note 26, at 413 ("[T]he Court ... repackaged the Lemon test by folding the inquiry 
of excessive entanglement into the inquiry of whether or not the government program had the impermissible 
effect of inhibiting or aiding religion."). 
56. The Justices themselves, while certainly not confused about the Lemon test, per se, were perhaps 
unable to coalesce around a sufficiently clear and workable methodology for its use in education funding 
cases. The muddled nature of this area of the law, then, perhaps has enabled the Justices to arrive at 
holdings that are to some extent ideologically convenient for them. With a precisely defined set of workable 
standards, the Court would be constrained to deciding cases in line with precedent. However, with the array 
of cases using, modifying, and ignoring the Lemon test, there is precedent available for pretty much any 
proposition regarding education funding that one favors. 
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simply overlooked. 57 In doing so, the Court further worsened the instability 
surrounding the subject area. 58 
B. The Proper Reading of the Establishment Clause 
The Court has become mired in confusion regarding the Establishment Clause-
developing, modifying, and at times ignoring the Lemon test, and seems uncertain as 
to how to proceed. Constitutional principles would be better served by a return to a 
more streamlined approach. At its core, the Establishment Clause bars the government 
from imposing religion on its citizens directly or indirectly: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion .... "59 To say that the Establishment 
Clause merely prohibits the government from, for example, authorizing an official state 
church ignores the fact that the clause is not worded precisely to refer to such state 
action. Thus, it can and should be deemed as a broad prohibition against various and 
subtle ways in which government action could be perceived as supportive of religion. 
Historically, it certainly cannot be said that all of the Framers were in agreement 
as to what would and would not constitute a government "establishment" ofreligion. 
There were those who advocated direct funding of training for the clergy, a sentiment 
that was acceptable in the far more ideologically homogeneous setting of the nineteenth 
century. Today, however, in a society that is more pluralistic than any of the Framers 
could possibly have imagined, it would be wiser to follow the sentiments of those who 
foresaw a need to take a more separationist approach. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, 
called for a "wall of separation between church and state," 60 in order to allow 
individuals the freedom to worship ( or not worship) as they so chose. James Madison 
also viewed religion as something which "must be left to the conviction and conscience 
of every man[,]" 61 rather than imposed by the government. 
57. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,234 (1997). The Court elaborated: 
[The] program does not run afoul of any of the three primary criteria we currently use to 
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: It does not result in 
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an 
excessive entanglement. We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing 
supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid 
under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the premises of sectarian 
schools by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as 
those present here. 
Id. at 234-35. 
58. See William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal 
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) 
("[T]he Court's commitment to its announced doctrines is tenuous at best. Every new case accepted for 
argument presents the very real possibility that the Court might totally abandon its previous efforts and start 
over."); Steven D. Smith, The Iceberg of Religious Freedom: Sub-Surface Levels of Nonestablishment 
Discourse, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 799, 800 (2005) (referring to Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a 
"chaotic mass of modem precedents"). 
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. I, I 802), available at 
http://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html. 
61. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, app. 
at 64 (1947). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 520 2007
520 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2 
These separationist sentiments highlight two very important rationales for the 
existence of the Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution, and its important role 
in the success of our constitutional government. In prohibiting governmental support 
of religion, the Establishment Clause both ensures that individual citizens perceive that 
their beliefs are respected as much as the beliefs of others, and that they in turn respect 
the government. 62 The Establishment Clause also limits the risk of potentially 
disruptive religious conflict. 63 
In keeping with these Jeffersonian and Madisonian views, the Court in Everson 
correctly stated that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from "pass[ing] 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. "64 
Additionally, the Court articulated that "[ n ]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, 
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 65 The fact that these 
strongly worded statements appear in an opinion ultimately upholding a challenged 
funding program helps to delineate where the line between permissible and 
impermissible funding should be drawn; the program at issue in Everson used state 
funds to cover the transportation expenses of students attending secular and religious 
schools, but was not allocated to parochial school tuition. The connection between 
expenditures for buses and religious indoctrination is quite attenuated, and thus the 
government funding is permissible. Meanwhile, the connection between parochial 
school tuition and religious teachings is much closer and thus should be subject to the 
separationist logic of Everson. 
Clarity from the Supreme Court on public funding of religious education-
although it has been sorely lacking, primarily because of the confusion surrounding the 
Lemon test-is of utmost importance. While many school funding cases in recent 
years have involved state constitutional provisions, 66 the majority of case law on the 
subject has centered on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 67 Indeed, 
Zelman was decided entirely based on the U.S. Constitution, and while the reasoning 
of Locke examined a state constitutional provision, the Court also endeavored to 
determine whether that Washington State Constitutional provision was permissible 
under the U.S. Constitution. In the interest of stability going forward in this area of the 
62. Justice Black explained: 
The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, 
showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the 
inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of 
those who held contrary beliefs. 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962). 
63. One of the purposes of the Establishment Clause is to "protect[] the Nation's social fabric from 
religious conflict .... " Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
64. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
65. Id. at 16. 
66. Rita-Anne O'Neill, The School Voucher Debate After Zelman: Can States Be Compelled to Fund 
Sectarian Schools Under the Federal Constitution?, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1397, 1398 (2003) ("The most widely 
discussed state challenges involve individual state constitutional provisions that require a more stringent 
separation of church and state than the federal Establishment Clause."). 
67. Even in those cases involving state constitutional provisions, those provisions are, in tum, 
necessarily examined under the Federal Constitution as well. 
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law, all parties involved would be best served by clear guidance from the Court as to 
how to interpret the Establishment Clause in light of the Free Exercise Clause. As the 
Court has strayed further and further from the text and rationale of the Establishment 
Clause, any guidance provided for lower courts has become increasingly murky. A 
better course of action, then, would be to return to a more simplified analysis, focusing 
on the text of the clause itself, and its Jeffersonian and Madisonian roots, as the Court 
did in Everson. Unfortunately, the Court instead chose to muddy the waters further in 
two recent Establishment Clause cases: Zelman and Locke. 
C. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, decided in 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for a divided Court, upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship 
Program. 68 The program, which provided tuition aid for primary and secondary 
students in school districts "under federal court order requiring supervision and 
operational management of the district by the state superintendent[]," 69 allowed 
families in the failing Cleveland school district to send their children to private secular 
schools, private religious schools, or neighboring public schools, and to use 
government-issued vouchers to offset tuition costs at those schools. 70 The use of 
program vouchers at private religious schools prompted a group of Ohio taxpayers to 
challenge the program, alleging that it violated the Establishment Clause. 71 
Although both the district court 72 and the court of appeals 73 found that the Pilot 
Project Scholarship Program ran afoul of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court 
upheld the program. 74 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the 
program had a valid secular purpose, while not having the effect of advancing religion. 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist twisted the issue 
at hand and based his logic less on principles of law than on legally irrelevant facts. 
Rather than analyzing the use of public funds for religious education and whether 
that amounts to a government endorsement ofreligion, Rehnquist focused on statistics 
pertaining to the educational failures of the Cleveland public school system, and on the 
fact that the money in question found its way to parochial schools by way of parents' 
private choices. While the statistics regarding the academic failure of the Ohio public 
school system may be sympathetic, they are not relevant to a constitutional analysis of 
whether state action violates the Establishment Clause. 75 
68. 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002). 
69. Id. at 644-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 33 I 3.975(A)(Anderson 1999 and Supp. 2000)). 
70. Id. at 646 ('Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families with incomes 
below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition 
up to $2,250."). 
71. Id. at 648. 
72. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
73. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). 
74. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663. 
7 5. Justice Stevens, in his Zelman dissent, stated, "[T]he severe educational crisis that confronted the 
Cleveland City School District when Ohio enacted its voucher program is not a matter that should affect 
our appraisal of its constitutionality." Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went on to say 
that "the emergency may have given some families a powerful motivation to leave the public school system 
and accept religious indoctrination that they would otherwise have avoided, but that is not a valid reason 
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Rehnquist's focus on the fact that Ohio's program was one of "private 
choice"-that is, parents could choose whether or not to send their children to religious 
schools-is similarly irrelevant to a proper Establishment Clause analysis. 76 The fact 
that parents chose the schools at which to use their vouchers does nothing to remove 
the essential problem that the government was impermissibly funding religious 
education. 77 Unfortunately, the manner in which Rehnquist approached Zelman 
resulted in a very important and influential opinion concerning a currently contentious 
area of law that lacks the intellectual rigor and constitutional precision needed to be 
helpful, persuasive, and fully respected as precedent. Rather, the holes in its logic 
leave it vulnerable to intellectual critique. 
In initially presenting the issue before the Court in Zelman, Rehnquist stated as a 
truism that the program at issue was enacted "for the valid secular purpose of providing 
educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school 
system." 7s While that may be true, Rehnquist went no further in examining whether 
this actually was a secular purpose, and if so, why it was valid. Even if his reasoning 
was relatively simple on this point, it should have been articulated in the opinion. If 
he had done so, Rehnquist would have penned an opinion far more capable of 
clarifying much confusion, and more worthy of judicial respect for years to come. 
Having quickly and cursorily stated that the Ohio program had a valid secular 
purpose, Rehnquist continued by stating that the question before the Court thus became 
"whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or 
inhibiting religion." 79 Later in the opinion, Rehnquist reframed that issue further, 
stating "[t]he Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into 
sending their children to religious schools ... _ .. so However, these two manners of 
framing the issue at hand are not the same. Whether or not coercion is present is 
simply one of several factors involved in an analysis of the effect of state action under 
the Establishment Clause.s 1 The fact that state action does not coerce citizens does not 
automatically rule out impermissible effect under the Establishment Clause and 
for upholding the program." Id. at 684-85. 
76. The Court has previously stated that choice cannot save an otherwise unconstitutional program; 
"[t]he absence of any element of coercion ... is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment 
Clause." Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973). 
77. Justice Stevens, in his Zelman dissent, stated: 
[T]he voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over an 
education in the public school system seems to me quite irrelevant to the question whether 
the government's choice to pay for religious indoctrination is constitutionally permissible . 
. . . [nhe Court seems to have decided that the mere fact that a family that cannot afford a 
private education wants its children educated in a parochial school is a sufficient 
justification for this use of public funds. . .. [T]he Court's decision is profoundly 
misguided. 
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also articulated that '"parental choice' 
cannot significantly alleviate the constitutional problem" with the Ohio voucher program. Id. at 717 
(Breyer, J ., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 649. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 655-56. 
81. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 ("The absence 
of any element of coercion, however, is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause."). 
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therefore confer on that action a stamp of constitutionality. Indeed, state action which 
does not coerce could nonetheless have an impermissible effect for other reasons. In 
order to persuasively show the constitutionality of the program, Rehnquist should have 
examined whether any features of the program had an effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion. 82 Instead, Rehnquist considered the lack of coerciveness in the program to 
be conclusive as to its effect. That narrow approach has no constitutional support. The 
level of analysis Rehnquist gave to this particular part of the opinion leaves his logic 
open to much criticism, and therefore is less likely to hold up as clear, helpful 
precedent in the future. 
Also problematic is the fact that Rehnquist referred to the primary effect of state 
action in this context. 83 A primary effect analysis does not get to the core of what the 
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. Whether state action runs afoul of the 
Establishment Clause should be based on more than simply the primary effect of that 
action; indeed, the analysis should be far more thorough. Any one state action could 
potentially have innumerable effects, and if any of them advance or inhibit religion, 
that state action should be declared unconstitutional. 84 For instance, if a government 
voucher program that includes religious schools has the multiple effects of benefiting 
churches, increasing the number ofreligious adherents in a community, and providing 
students with adequate education, the first two effects should not be judicially 
overlooked merely because one could plausibly say that the effect on education is 
primary. If the remaining effects are truly present in a particular community, they 
provide justification for a program to be declared unconstitutional. 
Rehnquist attempted to bolster his argument by lamenting the failing public 
schools in Cleveland, including statistics showing this failure. 85 While it may be 
deplorable for public school children to be subject to substandard education, that fact 
should not find its way into Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Nowhere in the 
Establishment Clause--or anywhere in the Constitution, for that matter-is there an 
express or implied exception for instances in which a group of people are particularly 
sympathetic. 86 Admittedly, an issue as heated as substandard education can cause one 
82. In fact, some scholars might argue that the Pilot Project Scholarship Program-and other voucher 
programs like it-inhibit religion. For instance, one could argue that involvement with the government 
dilutes the religiosity of parochial education, or even dilutes religion generally. As a specific example, 
Florida's Opportunity Scholarship Program allowed voucher funds to go to religious schools as long as 
those schools agreed "not to compel any student attending the private school [by benefit of the voucher 
program] to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, orto worship." FLA. STAT.§ 229.0537(4)(1999), 
invalidated by Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 
(2007)). Such restrictions dilute and hinder the manner in which religious institutions are able to 
indoctrinate their young followers. This indoctrination is a key facet of the success of organized religion, 
and, as long as not funded by the government, is entirely permissible. Indeed, for the State of Florida to 
include this limitation raises serious free exercise questions. Without it, of course, the state believed it 
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Hence the decades-old and confusing concern with that 
elusive concept of"entanglement." 
83. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 660 (dismissing as arbitrary one suggested way "to assess 
primary effect"). Justice O'Connor also referred to the "primary effect" examination in her concurrence. 
536 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
84. See supra Part ll.B. 
85. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644. 
86. Justice Souter, in his Zelman dissent, reminded the Court that '"constitutional lines have to be 
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to "blur the line between constitutionality and social concerns," 87 but Supreme Court 
Justices are charged with the difficult but very important task of avoiding the 
temptation of being swayed by sympathetic but glaringly extra-constitutional 
reasoning. 88 The fact that Cleveland's schools were failing simply does not justify 
Ohio's allocation of taxpayer dollars to religious schools in order to solve the problem. 
As Justice Souter said in his Zelman dissent, "If there were an excuse for giving short 
shrift to the Establishment Clause, it would probably apply here. But there is no 
excuse. Constitutional limitations are placed on government to preserve constitutional 
values in hard cases, like these." 89 
Rehnquist also departed from the examination of the text of the Establishment 
Clause by highlighting the fact that the state of Ohio did not, under the Pilot Project 
Scholarship Program, give funds directly to religious schools.9° Funds were sent to 
families in voucher form, and those families then chose to which educational institution 
to send their children, and thus to which institution to allocate the voucher representing 
government funds. The result, however, is no different than if the state had funded 
religious schools directly. Both through direct funding and through voucher programs, 
religious institutions receive money from public coffers-money that is collected 
compulsorily from the general population-and this is what the Establishment Clause 
was designed to prohibit. 
Further, Rehnquist's reasoning that the Ohio program involved indirect funding 
is even more disingenuous in light of the fact that the funding is only indirect because 
of a procedural formality; only when families choose to send children to private 
schools are "checks made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to 
the chosen school." 91 The implication of this reasoning, then, is that states may take 
advantage of a constitutional "loop-hole" and appropriate public funds to religious 
organizations as long as those funds are first diverted through individuals. 92 In fact, 
those individuals need not ever have genuine control over the funds in question. 
Parents are not permitted to use the funds in any way, other than signing them over to 
the school they have chosen for their children, which may, under Zelman, be a religious 
school. Simply signing over an uncashed check to a religious school will suffice for 
indirectness under Zelman-a result that entirely ignores the Court's determination in 
drawn, and on one side of every one of them is an otherwise sympathetic case that provokes impatience 
with the Constitution and with the line. But constitutional lines are the price of constitutional 
government."' Id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 254 (1997). 
87. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1399. 
88. Rehnquist has, in the past, joined a dissent by Justice Scalia, which spoke approvingly of "those 
who adhere to the Court's ... traditional view that the Constitution bears its original meaning and is 
unchanging." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371-72 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Therefore, it is curious that he would then write an opinion that is far from based on the Constitution's 
"original" and "unchanging" meaning. 
89. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 652-53 (majority opinion). 
9 I. Id. at 646. 
92. As one commentator has noted, "Zelman indicates that, so long as the programs exhibit 
governmental neutrality toward religion, indirect aid programs are permissible under the Establishment 
Clause, regardless of whether or not tuition money is ultimately diverted for religious purposes." Patrick 
M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for 
Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. I, 12 (2005). 
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Nyquist that the constitutionality of government aid to religious schools could not be 
saved by an "ingenious plan[] for channeling state aid to sectarian schools"93 through 
parents, rather than funding religious schools directly. 94 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not offer sound legal reasoning as to why the Pilot 
Project Scholarship Program was constitutional. 95 As distressing as that may be, 
perhaps more problematic is the fact that the Zelman opinion left educators and policy 
makers with little guidance as to how to proceed in this area. Rehnquist "did not 
answer the question of whether a state or municipality must include sectarian schools 
in a school voucher program that provides aid to public and non-sectarian private 
schools." 96 In fact, the Court "substantially weakened the mandate [of the 
Establishment Clause] when it decided that neutrality and 'true private choice' were 
the criteria used in evaluating the constitutionality of government programs. "97 
D. Locke v. Davey 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote for the Court two years later, in Locke v. 
Davey, 98 which resulted in the lack of public funding for religious education, 99 and 
provided a counterpoint-although not clearly articulated-for the excessively 
permissive tone of the Zelman decision. Locke centered on the State of Washington's 
Promise Scholarship Program, which provided funds for college students who had 
achieved academic success in high school 1°0 and demonstrated financial need. 101 The 
program allowed students to spend their scholarship funds at eligible, accredited 
93. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973). 
94. Toe Nyquist Court's denunciation of government aid to sectarian schools was unambiguous: 
"Special tax benefits ... cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions of 
this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to 
sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions." 
Id. at 793. 
95. One commentator has surmised, generally: 
[M]aybe the lawyers and scholars and judges are not so much deriving their conclusions 
from the arguments they publicly offer, but rather are (consciously or unconsciously) 
selecting from a rich batch of rhetorical resources whatever materials and arguments operate 
to support outcomes that they are already predisposed to favor on other grounds. Maybe 
premises are being derived from conclusions, not the other way around. 
Smith, supra note 58, at 801. 
96. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1409. 
97. Crocker, supra note 26, at 395-96. 
98. Many were surprised that Chief Justice Rehnquist supported, and even wrote, the separationist 
opinion in Locke. See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Room for "Play in the Joints "-Locke v. Davey, 33 J.L. 
& EDUC. 457 (2004) (speculating that perhaps Rehnquist' s "fear of federal encroachments on states' rights 
may have simply overridden [his] support of government accommodation toward religion"). 
99. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). 
I 00. Toe parameters of academic success were defined as follows: 
To be eligible for the scholarship, a student must meet academic, income, and enrollment 
requirements. A student must graduate from a Washington public or private high school and 
either graduate in the top 15% of his graduating class, or attain on the first attempt a 
cumulative score of 1,200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I or a score of27 or 
better on the American College Test. 
Id. at 716. 
IOI. Id. ("Toe student's family income must be less than 135% of the State's median."). 
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institutions, 102 including sectarian colleges (a point not before the Court), but excluding 
the pursuit of degrees in theology. 103 After his Promise Scholarship had been revoked 
because of his pursuit of a degree in devotional theology, Mr. Davey filed suit, 
asserting that the exclusion violated his rights of free exercise, establishment, and free 
speech. 104 The State of Washington, however, contended that, regardless of whether 
funding ofMr. Davey's religious education would violate the Establishment Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, the Washington Constitution's prohibition against funding 
religion applied and the denial of funds it required did not violate his rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. 105 
Writing for a seven-member majority of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
acknowledged that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment "are frequently in tension[]," 106 but that "'there is room for play in the 
joints' between them." 107 By falling back on this imprecise notion of the space 
between what the Free Exercise Clause requires of government and what the 
Establishment Clause forbids, Rehnquist failed to provide a clear and useful directive 
for lower courts, particularly in light of the earlier Zelman decision. While Locke was 
correctly decided in that it prevented public funds from subsidizing Davey's religious 
education, the Court would have been wiser to state a more clear and forceful rationale, 
rather than wade further into the murkiness that is their public funding of religious 
educationjurisprudence. In fact, as one commentator noted, "[t]he Court's holding left 
a great deal of uncertainty on when states may withhold benefits on the basis of 
religion." 108 
It has also been suggested that the Locke Court, realizing that state constitutional 
amendments could increasingly become the focal point of arguments in school funding 
cases, 109 was concerned that an accomodationist ruling-including a determination that 
Washington's state constitutional prohibition against funding religion violated the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution-would lead to states being compelled to 
I 02. Id. ("[T]he student must enroll 'at least halftime in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state 
of Washington .... "' (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 250-80-020(12)(t))). 
I 03. Id. ("[T]he student ... may not pursue a degree in theology ... while receiving the scholarship."). 
104. Id. at 718. 
105. At oral argument, counsel for the State of Washington articulated the following: 
The line between funds for secular purposes and for religious purposes is a line that's been 
recognized by this Court in various funding cases and in reviewing government activities . 
. . . [SJ imply because the State of Washington is extending those values of the Establishment 
Clause beyond direct funding into indirect funding does not convert those values into 
hostility. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/02-1315 .pdf. 
106. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718. 
107. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970)). 
I 08. Brett Thompson, Note, Locke v. Davey: The Fine Line Between Free Exercise and Establishment, 
56 MERCER L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2005). 
109. According to one commentator, "almost all school litigation involving church/state questions has 
been based on interpretations of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This may change 
significantly, given the vitality of state antiestablishment provisions solidified in Locke combined with the 
Court's relaxed interpretation of the Establishment Clause." McCarthy, supra note 98, at 464. 
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include religious schools in voucher programs. 110 Under such reasoning, the holding 
in Locke served to avoid this negative potential outcome. Questions at oral argument 
in Locke indicate that this was indeed a key factor for the Justices; that is, they seemed 
concerned with maintaining the rights of states to decide whether or not to include 
religious schools in such programs. For instance, Justice O'Connor asked several 
times about the Promise Scholarship Program's possible similarities to an elementary 
or secondary school voucher program, 111 the likely format in which future debates over 
those states' rights issues would arise. If state courts are left to tackle an increasing 
number of cases dealing with these issues, then states will potentially have more 
control over how these issues will be resolved. One commentator has suggested that 
the applicability of Locke, a case dealing with a university scholarship program, to 
elementary and secondary school voucher programs in general may be limited. 112 
The Locke Court did, however, suggest that the requirement for future litigants 
might be to show that, in failing to provide funds in a given context, the state showed 
animus toward religion. 113 This is a high hurdle-and an appropriate one-for future 
plaintiffs seeking to use state funds at religious institutions. This properly allows states 
the flexibility to choose not to fund sectarian instruction because of anti establishment 
concerns. Indeed, a state would have to enact a quite egregious statute or 
constitutional provision in order to reach the point of actual "animus" toward religion. 
Ill. APPLICATION OF ZELMAN AND LOCKE 
The seemingly competing Zelman and Locke cases have been applied by courts 
in various states, including Florida, New Hampshire, and Maine. Following an 
analysis of the manner in which the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit have weighed these issues, Part IV of this Comment 
goes on to examine the course taken in Maine. 
110. "Justice Breyer referred to the implications of ruling in favor of Davey as 'breathtaking,' impacting 
the way states allocate funds so that they cannot 'be purely secular' and 'they must fund all religions who 
want' to engage in the same activity." Jason S. Marks, Spackle/or the Wall? Public Funding/or School 
Vouchers After Locke v. Davey, 61 J. Mo. B. 150, 155-56 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, 
Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/02-1315.pdf). 
ll I. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Locke, 540 U.S. 712 (No. 02-1315), available at 
http:/ /www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/02-1315 .pdf. 
112. See Shannon Black, Note, Locke v. Davey and the Death of Neutrality as a Concept Guiding 
Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 19 Sr. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 337, 374-76 (2005). 
Id. 
[T]he Court took pains to limit Locke to its particular facts .... [A]t least one of the justices 
in the Zelman majority expressed concern about the impact of a decision in Davey's favor 
on school voucher plans already in place in several states that do exclude religious schools[;] 
it is unlikely that the Court would reverse the trend it started in Locke in school vouchers 
cases. 
ll3. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (holding that "we [do not] find ... in the operation of the Promise 
Scholarship Program[] anything that suggests animus towards religion .... [W]e therefore cannot conclude 
that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect."). 
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A. Bush v. Holmes 
The State of Florida had an opportunity to struggle with the Zelman-Locke 
precedents and the confusing issues those opinions have left in their wake in Bush v. 
Holmes. 114 In that case, a group of voucher opponents attacked the constitutionality 
of Florida's Opportunity Scholarship Program under Florida's state constitution. 115 
Much like the Pilot Project Scholarship Program at issue in Zelman, Florida's voucher 
program was created in response to what legislators saw as "failing" public schools, 116 
rather than a lack of available public schools or for any other stated reason. 
The validity of the Florida Constitution's so-called "no-aid" provision was in tum 
questioned under the U.S. Constitution. 117 The Florida provision states that "[n]o 
revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious 
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. " 118 Voucher proponents argued that 
either the Florida Constitution imposed greater restrictions on aid to religious schools 
than does the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and thus should be 
declared violative of the Free Exercise Clause and therefore unconstitutional, or that 
the no-aid provision did not impose additional restrictions, and thus the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program must be upheld under the reasoning of Zelman. 119 The District 
Court of Appeal of Florida, on rehearing en bane, agreed that, if the two provisions 
were coterminous, Zelman dictated that the program must be upheld. 120 However, it 
114. 886 So.2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
115. When this litigation began, the plaintiffs advanced both federal and state constitutional arguments. 
id. at 344. In 2000, the trial court found the Opportunity Scholarship Program to be impermissible; the 
District Court of Appeal ofFlorida reversed, upheld the program, stated simply that the state legislature may 
fund private school education if it deems such funding necessary, ignored the plaintiffs' constitutional 
arguments, and remanded the case back to the trial court. Id. at 345. While on remand, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Zelman. Id. Based on the reasoning of Zelman, the plaintiffs dismissed their federal 
constitutional claims and relied instead on state constitutional principles. id. The trial court found the 
program violative of the state constitution, and entered an injunction preventing implementation of the 
Opportunity Scholarship Program. Id. at 346. 
116. The Florida Legislature construed that state's constitution as promising a high-quality education 
for all students, a promise which the U.S. Constitution does not make. Id. at 347. Under the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program, when Florida public schools were deemed to be "failing" for two years out of a four 
year period, the legislature required that the schools notify parents and guardians of attendees of such 
failure, and of their option to send their children to another, more successful public school, or to use state 
funds (in the form of a voucher) to send their children to private school. Id. If a parent or guardian chose 
the latter, the state issued a warrant payable to the parent, but mailed to the private school, at which point 
the parent was to endorse the warrant over to the school. Id. 
id. 
117. Id. at 344. 
118. FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 3 (emphasis added). 
119. Bush, 886 So. 2d at 344. 
120. Id. at 359. The Bush court elaborated: 
Ifwe were resolving this case purely on Establishment Clause principles, the fact that the 
OSP program on its face has a religiously neutral purpose-to aid children in failing public 
schools-and the fact that the OSP gives parents or guardians the freedom of choice in 
selecting an alternative to a failing public school, would be dispositive factors, without 
regard to whether a disbursement was made directly to a parent or guardian rather than the 
school. 
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found that the Establishment Clause and the relevant part of the Florida Constitution 
were not synonymous. 121 Accordingly, it struck down the Opportunity Scholarship 
Program. Importantly, the court found the state constitutional provision to be more 
restrictive than the Establishment Clause, 122 but not so much so that it ran afoul of the 
Free Exercise Clause. 123 Apparently, Florida's no-aid provision fell in the vast "play 
in the joints" 124 between the two clauses. 125 
Ultimately, the Opportunity Scholarship Program, to the extent that program funds 
found their way to religious schools, was struck down in Bush v. Holmes because it ran 
afoul of the no-aid provision in Florida's state constitution. 126 The no-aid provision 
itself was found to be acceptable under the Federal Free Exercise Clause as well as the 
free exercise clause of the Florida Constitution. 127 
The Bush court also asked the Florida Supreme Court to weigh in on the question 
of whether the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program violated the Florida 
constitution. 128 The reasoning under the no-aid language of the Florida Constitution-
that is, that no government funds may reach religious institutions either directly or 
indirectly-is arguably also the appropriate reasoning to use under the Federal 
Establishment Clause for alljurisdictions. 129 While the Florida Constitution included 
the explicit "direct or indirect" language and the Federal Establishment Clause does 
not, the Federal Establishment Clause was intended to provide the same protection, and 
the "direct or indirect" concept should be deemed to be implied. 130 
Id. 
121. Id. at 344. The Bush court stated: 
[W]e cannot read the entirety of article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution to be 
substantively synonymous with the federal Establishment Clause, [and therefore] find the 
appellants' arguments without merit . 
. . . [T]he no-aid provision ... expands the restrictions in state aid and to religion by 
specifically prohibiting the expenditure of public funds "directly or indirectly" to aid 
sectarian institutions. 
122. Id. at 359-60 ("We find it significant that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a 
state constitutional provision substantially similar to Florida's no-aid provision is 'far stricter' than the 
Establishment Clause." (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep'tofServs. for the Blind, 479 U.S. 481,489 (1986))). 
123. Id. at 363. 
124. The Supreme Court first coined the phrase "play in the joints" in upholding property tax exemptions 
granted to religious organizations. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (I 970). 
125. The Bush court stated that "there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause. This case involves that 'play in the joints' .... " Bush, 886 So. 
2d at 364. 
126. Id. at 344 ("There is no dispute in this case that state funds are paid to sectarian schools through 
the OPS vouchers. Thus, we hold the OSP unconstitutional under the no-aid provision to the extent that 
the OSP authorizes state funds to be paid to sectarian schools."). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 367. 
129. The text of the Establishment Clause is as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). This text indicates that any law 
thus respecting an establishment of religion will be unconstitutional. The Establishment Clause does not 
merely prohibit laws respecting a "direct" establishment of religion. Therefore, both direct and indirect 
funding should be considered impermissible under the Federal Constitution. 
130. See discussion supra Part 11.8. 
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B. Gary S. v. Manchester School District 
Zelman and Locke were applied in a New Hampshire case as well, although 
somewhat more tangentially. Unlike the programs at issue in the Zelman and Bush 
litigation, Gary S. v. Manchester School District 131 did not involve a voucher program. 
Rather, parents of a disabled child attending a private religious school contended that 
their child should be entitled to "the panoply of services available to disabled public 
school students," 132 making the case fall more squarely, factually, under Locke. Among 
other things, the parents argued that the ineligibility for services at a religious school 
violated their child's free exercise rights. 133 The First Circuit disagreed, however, and 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Manchester School District. 134 
The First Circuit prefaced its discussion of the plaintiffs' free exercise claim with 
an acknowledgement that this area oflaw is murky at best, and that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not given lower courts adequate guidance as to how to properly resolve 
religion cases such as this one. 135 Obviously, the Zelman and Locke opinions did not 
provide lower courts with sufficient guidance on the topic. 
What the court did take clearly from Zelman, however, is the view that states may 
divert public funds to private schools, but are not required to do so. 136 Meanwhile, 
Locke, which was factually more similar to the case, was mentioned only cursorily in 
a footnote. 137 
Ultimately, the First Circuit based its holding in favor of the Manchester School 
District on the fact that the benefit sought by plaintiff was not generally available and 
that it would be ''unreasonable and inconsistent to premise a free exercise violation" 
on a benefit of such limited availability. 138 Accordingly, the opinion did not implicate 
the "play in the joints" model as directly as other cases have, and the court did not 
131. 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004). 
132. Id. at 17. 
133. Id. The plaintiffs also advanced due process and equal protection arguments, neither of which are 
relevant to this Comment. The free exercise claim was the plaintiffs' lead argument. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 18 ("It is not always easy to predict what analytical framework the Supreme Court will apply 
to the various, factually dissimilar free exercise cases that arise."). 
136. Id. at 20 n.l ("To be sure, the Court has recently permitted a state legislature to provide for 
attendance at private schools at public expense ifit so desires." (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002)) (emphasis added)). 
137. In referring to Locke, the First Circuit said: 
A further anomaly of such a holding would be that only persons such as appellants, with a 
declared religious belief in the necessity of sending their children to private schools, would 
be entitled under the First Amendment to the funding sought. Other students, including 
those in secular private schools, would lack a right to such funding. 
Id. at 20 n.3. It seems curious that the opinion did not expand on this concept, as it speaks directly to the 
concept of state action favoring religion. 
138. Id. The Gary S. court said: 
[Our] methodology leaves all parents with ultimate recourse to the public schools whenever 
the balance of services associated with attendance at a private school appears to them to be 
unsatisfactory; but the option thus available can necessitate their having to choose, as here, 
between alternatives each of which may seem imperfect. In any event, we cannot say that 
the federal government's structuring ofbenefits here violates appellants' free exercise rights. 
Id. at 21. 
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discuss Zelman and Locke at length. 139 It did, however, mention those two cases 
enough to show the confusion they have caused and the bailing enormity of the 
resulting "play in the joints" concept with which courts have been forced to grapple. 
IV. MAINE'S APPROACH 
Since the passing of the Free High School Act 140 in 1873, Maine has been using 
state funds to pay the education expenses of those students who reside in towns without 
public high schools. 141 In 1981, the Maine Legislature excluded religious schools from 
the receipt of those funds. 142 This prohibition is purely statutory; unlike most states, 
Maine's constitution neither prevents the state government from allocating money to 
religious institutions, nor does it protect citizens from being compelled to support 
religion. 143 Accordingly, any legal battles involving Maine school funding in the 
aftermath of Zelman and Locke will not include the same federal-state constitutional 
arguments that were seen in Locke. Potentially, future school funding plaintiffs may 
argue that the analysis of the Maine program falls more squarely under Zelman, in that 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is controlling of Establishment Clause 
arguments. However, because the Locke Court analyzed federal, rather than state, free 
exercise principles, this is the controlling precedent in determining how far a particular 
state may permissibly go in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation before running 
afoul of the Federal Free Exercise Clause. 
A. Bagley v. Raymond School Department 
In Bagley v. Raymond School Department, 144 which was decided before both 
Zelman and Locke, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, upheld 
Maine's education tuition program and its exclusion of religious schools from the 
program. Under Maine's tuition program, 145 "students of parents residing in a school 
district which neither maintains a secondary school nor contracts for secondary school 
privileges may attend a school approved for tuition purposes." 146 A school may be 
approved for tuition purposes "only if it ... [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance 
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." 147 When a family 
139. Both cases are mentioned briefly in footnotes. See id. nn. l & 3. 
140. As of the writing of this Comment, the current Maine statute governing education is as follows: 
In accordance with the Constitution of Maine, Article VIII, the Legislature shall enact the 
laws that are necessary to assure that all school administrative units make suitable 
provisions for the support and maintenance of the public schools. It is the intent of the 
Legislature that every person within the age limitations prescribed by state statutes shall be 
provided an opportunity to receive the benefits of a free public education. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2 (West 1993). 
141. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1417. 
142. Id. at 1418. The Maine statute dictates that "[a] private school may be approved for the receipt of 
public funds for tuition purposes only if it ... [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution[.]" ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (West 1993). 
143. O'Neill, supra note 66, at 1403. 
144. 1999 ME 60, 728 A.2d 127. 
145. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204(4) (West 1993). 
146. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ,i 2, 728 A.2d at 130. 
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951(2) (West 1993). This further emphasizes that analysis of 
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chooses to send a child to an approved private school under this program, rather than 
diverting funds through the family by way of a voucher, the school district in which the 
family resides pays tuition directly to the private school. 148 Much like the program at 
issue in Bush v. Hof mes, "funds ... emanate directly from the revenue of [ the state]." 149 
The Bagley family resided in Raymond, Maine, a town that did not have a 
secondary school and did not contract to send its students to another school. 150 Upon 
choosing to send their son to Cheverus High School, a religious school, and attempting 
unsuccessfully to have the Cheverus tuition paid for by the town ofRaymond under the 
Maine tuition program, the Bagley family filed suit, alleging that denial of such 
funding violated their Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clause 
rights. 151 
The Law Court found that the exclusion of religious institutions in the Maine 
tuition program did not violate the Bagleys' constitutional rights. 152 Setting up the 
framework for the opinion, then-Justice Saufley, writing for the Law Court, clarified 
that the court would presume that "the rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution and Maine Constitution are coextensive" because neither of the parties 
had alleged otherwise. 153 
Concerning the Free Exercise Clause, the Law Court stated that a law merely 
making the practice ofreligion more expensive does not place a "substantial burden" 
on an individual's free exercise rights. 154 The Law Court added that the Bagleys were 
"no more impaired in their efforts to seek a religious education for their sons than are 
parents of children in school districts that provide only a free nonreligious education 
in public schools. " 155 Accordingly, the state action ( or, more pre"isely, non-action and 
non-funding) at issue did nothing to interfere with the plaintiffs' ability to exercise their 
religion. 156 
The Establishment Clause was primarily relevant to the facts of the Bagley case 
in that the state's choice to refuse to allocate tuition funds to sectarian schools was 
based on the state's compliance with the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. 157 The Law Court stated, however, that the plaintiffs' use of an 
the Maine program falls under the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Maine's state 
constitution does not include increased antiestablishment protections, and its relevant statute specifically 
directs us to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
148. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, 'I[ 3, 728 A.2d at 130. 
149. 886 So. 2d 340,346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
150. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, 'I[ 6, 728 A.2d at I 3 I. 
151. Id. 'l['I[ 9, II, 728 A.2d at 131-32. 
152. Id. 'I[ 72, 728 A.2d at 147. 
153. Id. 'I[ 13, 728 A.2d at 132. This is different from the argument made in Locke; in that case, counsel 
for the State of Washington explicitly argued that Washington's constitution heightened the separation of 
church and state that is articulated in the U.S. Constitution. 
154. Id. 'I[ I 8, 728 A.2d at 134 ("(T]here is no substantial burden placed on an individual's free exercise 
of religion where a law or policy merely operates so as to make the practice of [the individual's] religious 
beliefs more expensive." ( quoting Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd, 60 F .3d I 68, 171 ( 4th Cir. I 995))). 
155. Id. 'I[ 18, 728 A.2d at 135. 
156. Id. 'I[ 20, 728 A.2d at 135. 
157. Id. 'II 5, 728 A.2d at 131 ("The State does not dispute that its only justification for excluding 
religious schools from the tuition program was compliance with the Establishment Clause."). 
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Establishment Clause argument under the facts as presented was "misplaced" 158 
because the Establishment Clause "simply does not speak to governmental actions that 
fail to support religion" 159 and there is therefore "no support for the proposition that 
the Establishment Clause prevents a state from refusing to fund religious schools." 160 
B. Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education 
Eulitt v. Maine, Department of Education 161 involved the same Maine tuition 
program and exclusion of religious schools that was at issue in Bagley. However, 
unlike Bagley, Eulittwas decided after the issuance of the Zelman and Locke opinions, 
and was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, rather than 
by the Law Court. In Eulitt, as in Bagley, a family that was denied state funding for 
tuition at a religious school asserted that such denial violated their constitutional rights; 
specifically, the Eulitts made Equal Protection and Establishment Clause arguments. 162 
The Eulitts also argued that, in the aftermath of the Zelman decision, Maine's 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting public funding of education 
at religious schools was no longer compatible with accepted Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 163 The First Circuit's analysis of this argument highlighted the chaos 
in which the Supreme Court left this area of the law after Zelman and Locke. 164 For 
instance, the opinion specifies that the district court "declined to consider the effects 
of Zelman and [ Locke ]," 165 when considering the current propriety ofMaine' s approach 
to the issue, and that the lower court was not in error in doing so. 166 The First Circuit 
distinguished the Zelman decision as not binding, in part because of the Supreme 
158. Id. ',i21, 728 A.2d at 135. 
159. Id.1122, 728 A.2d at 136. 
160. Id. 
I 6 I. 3 86 F .3d 344 (I st Cir. 2004 ). 
162. Id. at 347-48. In asserting an equal protection claim, the plaintiffs made the argument-distinct 
from their free exercise argument-that they were being discriminated against on the basis of their religious 
beliefs and that, because religion is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny should be applied. Id. at 353-54. 
However, the court, citing Locke, stated that such an argument was misguided; any state action that is 
permissible under the Free Exercise Clause can be subject only to rational basis scrutiny under an equal 
protection analysis. Id. at 354. The plaintiffs conceded that, using rational basis scrutiny, their equal 
protection claim must fail. Id. at 356. 
163. Id. at 347-48. The First Circuit, in determining whether stare decisis precluded relitigation of the 
matter, focused on its earlier decision in Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. I 999), in which the court 
"rejected [an] equal protection challenge because Maine had shown a compelling interest in avoiding an 
Establishment Clause violation through the exclusion of sectarian schools from its secondary education 
tuition program." Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 348 (citing Strout, 178 F.3d at 64). The Strout court speculated, but 
did not hold, that "if Maine's proffered interest had been found to depend upon an erroneous understanding 
of the Establishment Clause ... then the state's exclusion of sectarian schools from the tuition program 
would not withstand scrutiny." Id. (citing Strout, 178 F.3d at 64 n.12). Also, the Strout court found "no 
relevant precedent for using [the Establishment Clause's] negative prohibition as a basis for extending the 
right of a religiously affiliated group to secure state subsidies." Strout, 178 F.3d at 64. 
164. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 348 ("The Zelman opinion raises the distinct possibility that Strout's view of 
Maine's asserted interest depended upon an incorrect interpretation of the Establishment Clause's 
strictures."). 
165. Id. at 349. 
166. Id. ("We do not find fault with that cautious approach."). 
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Court's focus on "the facts underlying the Cleveland voucher program," 167 and went 
on to say that "[e]ven after Zelman and [Locke], it is fairly debatable whether or not 
the Maine tuition program could survive an Establishment Clause challenge if the state 
eliminated [ the program's restrictions] and allowed sectarian schools to receive tuition 
funds. ,,16s 
The manner in which the First Circuit approached the Eulitt opinion suggests that 
the Zelman Court, by relying heavily on the egregious condition of the public schools 
in Cleveland, rather than a thorough examination of Establishment Clause principles, 
issued an opinion that provides little guidance for lower courts. The implication is that 
the First Circuit would have ruled differently in the Eulitt case if the Maine voucher 
program were intended to fix a failing public school system, rather than simply to 
provide secondary education to students in areas with no local high school at all. But 
this implication reveals the deep flaws in the Zelman holding. Surely, the Establish-
ment Clause could not have been intended to mean that state funding of religious 
institutions is permissible only when sympathetic tales of economic woe or other 
hardship pull at our heartstrings. Rather, the Establishment Clause should be equally 
applicable to all instances of state funding ofreligious institutions regardless of the 
rationale behind the funding. 
The opinion in Eulitt also evinces that the Locke decision, much like the Zelman 
decision, seems insufficiently clear to be used effectively by lower courts. The First 
Circuit wrote, "[Locke] recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide 
education, may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entanglement with 
religion, even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so." 169 
Apparently, the First Circuit is unclear, under Locke, as to just what the Establishment 
Clause does require. This is precisely because the Locke opinion was indeed vague as 
to what the Establishment Clause requires. If the Eulitt opinion had spoken of 
legitimate state concerns and their connection with what the Establishment Clause does 
not require, Locke could be said to be clear and valuable precedent on the issue of 
public funding for religious education. However, the First Circuit's use of the phrase 
"may not" rather than "does not" in the preceding quote shows that this is not the case. 
Rather, lower courts have been left in a state of confusion as to how to proceed in this 
subsection of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Although the Supreme Court 
correctly decided Locke, it should have clearly enunciated the fact that the 
Establishment Clause does require states to refrain from funding religious education, 
and that, while the Free Exercise Clause establishes fundamental rights for citizens, the 
government is not required to subsidize those rights. The First Circuit also arrived at 
a proper determination in Eulitt, but was forced to do so based on arguably unclear 
guidance from the Locke Court. 
C. Anderson v. Town of Durham 
The Maine Law Court was recently faced with an opportunity to revisit the issue 
of school vouchers and religious schools, and to clarify this area of the law in Maine, 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 355. 
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in the case of Anderson v. Town of Durham. 170 Backed by the Institute for Justice, 171 
families from Durham, Minot, and Raymond-three Maine towns without public high 
schools-filed suit, alleging that those towns' refusal to reimburse them for tuition 
payments made to religious schools, pursuant to Maine's statutory exclusion of 
religious schools from the tuition program, 172 violated their rights under the Free 
Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 173 The 
defendant towns filed a successful motion to dismiss, 174 and the plaintiffs appealed to 
the Law Court. 
The Anderson plaintiffs argued that, regardless of the fact that the defendant towns 
were acting under color of state law, such action still constituted a violation of the 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and thus the towns themselves were liable to the 
plaintiffs for reimbursement of tuition. 175 The families contended that Maine's 
statutory exclusion ofreligious schools from its tuition program impinged on their free 
exercise rights 176 and that, in remedying this, the Law Court should overrule Bagley. 177 
The plaintiffs also urged the Law Court to overrule Bagley regarding its Establishment 
Clause holding. 178 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the equal protection reasoning of 
Bagley was based on an understanding of the Establishment Clause that had been 
invalidated by the Zelman case. 179 
Although the plaintiffs favored overruling Bagley, they relied heavily on a 
statement of the Law Court in that very case, that "[i]f the State's justification [for 
excluding religious schools from the tuition program] is based on an erroneous 
understanding of the Establishment Clause, its justification will not withstand any level 
170. 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944. 
171. Institute for Justice, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/maine2/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
172. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2951(2) (West 1993). 
173. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Julia and Kevin Anderson, et al. at 1, Anderson v. Town of 
Durham, 2006 ME 39,845 A.2d 944 (No. CUM-04-591). 
174. Anderson v. Town of Durham, No. Civ. A. CV-02-480, 2003 WL 21386768 (Me. Super. May 14, 
2003), ajf'd, 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661 (2006). The Superior Court 
(Crowley, J.) granted the motion on the grounds of municipal liability-i.e., that the action in question was 
state, not local action-and res judicata-i.e., that plaintiffs here were in sufficient privity with the Bagley 
plaintiffs as to bar the Anderson's claim. Id. 
175. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 175, at 23. 
176. Id. at 24. 
177. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from the reasoning of Bagley by insisting that 
the cases cited in Bagley all involved statutes that were facially neutral with respect to religion. Id. at 25. 
However, the Bagley case was decided in 1999, well after the state legislature excluded religious schools 
from the tuition program in section 2951 (2). 
178. The plaintiffs made an awkward attempt at an Establishment Clause argument, essentially 
reiterating their free exercise argument. Id. at 31. ("[The Bagley court's analysis] is correct in the sense that 
the Establishment Clause does not require the government to affirmatively support religion, but incorrect 
in not recognizing that the Clause has a role in preventing government action inhibiting or hindering 
religion."). 
Id. 
179. Id. at 36-37. 
The effect of Zelman is to render obsolete this Court's conclusion in Bagley that the 
inclusion of religious schools from parents' choices was necessary to comply with the 
Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause neither requires nor allows the exclusion . 
. . . Thus, as this Court recognized in Bagley, there is no rational basis for the exclusion, 
since it is based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause. 
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of scrutiny" under an equal protection analysis. 180 In light of Zelman, the plaintiffs 
argued, the Law Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause was in fact 
erroneous, and should be subject to strict scrutiny and declared unconstitutional. 
Justice Alexander, however, writing for the Law Court, determined that even though 
under Zelman the Establishment Clause does not forbid states from funding religious 
education, Locke more appropriately determines the appropriate level of equal 
protection scrutiny, which is rational basis. 181 Because Justice Alexander found valid 
justifications for the tuition program, he reasoned that the statute withstood rational 
basis equal protection analysis. 182 
The plaintiffs' free exercise argument, that the State may not limit school choice 
on the basis of religion, failed as well. The Law Court determined that the tuition 
program's exclusion of religious schools from the receipt of public funds was not 
evidence of animosity toward religion, and that, even though the program incidentally 
burdened a religious practice, rational basis scrutiny did not mandate that the state 
offer a compelling governmental interest. 183 Furthermore, Justice Alexander suggested 
that the statute would not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if subjected to strict 
scrutiny. 184 
Interestingly, Justice Alexander did not address separately the plaintiffs' 
Establishment Clause argument, choosing instead to discuss it as it relates to the proper 
level of scrutiny in the analysis of the equal protection claim. 185 On the one hand, 
Zelman seems, quite obviously, to control the Establishment Clause analysis, thus 
making a discussion by the Law Court superfluous at best and futile at worst. 
However, in stating that there were "Establishment Clause concerns not necessarily 
governed by Zelman," 186 Justice Alexander hinted at a potential rationale for more 
clearly demarcating at least one side of the gap that is the "play in the joints," and it is 
curious why he chose not to expand upon this. 
V. THE VIABILITY OF MAINTAINING CURRENT POLICIES IN MAINE 
The Supreme Court's lack of clear, usable precedent in the area of education 
funding under the Establishment Clause-coupled with its opinions supported in large 
part by non-legal, irrelevant arguments rather than valid constitutional principles-
180. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 1999 ME 60, ,r 32, 728 A.2d 127, 138. 
181. Justice Alexander stated, "Locke and Eulitt have clarified that when performing the equal protection 
analysis in religious school funding cases, strict scrutiny applies only to the claim that the parents' 
fundamental right to the free exercise of religion is implicated; all other claims of religious discrimination 
are subject to rational basis scrutiny." Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 399, ,r 56, 895 A.2d 944, 
959-60, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661 (2006). 
182. Specifically, the state's justifications included "Establishment Clause concerns not necessarily 
governed by Zelman, such as excessive entanglement between religion and state." Id. ,r 57, 895 A.2d at 
960. Justice Alexander further conjectured that various "conflicts between state curriculum, record keeping 
and anti-discrimination requirements and religious teachings and religious practices in some schools ... 
could result in significant entanglement of State education officials in religious matters ... [, which] 
provides a rational basis to maintain the funding limitation .... " Id. ,r 60, 895 A.2d at 961. 
183. Id. ,r,r 52-54, 895 A.2d at 959. 
184. Id. ,r 53, 895 A.2d at 959. 
185. See id. ,i,r 56-60, 895 A.2d at 959-61. 
186. Id. ,r 57,895 A.2d at 960. 
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could potentially leave educators, administrators, and judges at a loss as to how to best 
predict what programs will be deemed permissible in the future. In Maine, fortunately, 
the Law Court has resolved much of the uncertainty in a manner that maintains the 
strength of the Establishment Clause while avoiding a violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause. In other states, however, the analysis could change dramatically in the coming 
years, as voucher advocates seek to repeal applicable state constitutional 
amendments. 187 If those attempts are successful, the already confusing area of school 
funding law could be muddled anew. To be sure, the nature of the Establishment 
Clause does not make issues surrounding it simple, 188 but the Court could have made 
a better effort of clearly stating its reasoning in this area. 
Maine is one of a "handful of ... states ... in which Zelman reopened the debate 
over the constitutionality of nonpublic school funding," 189 in large part because of 
Maine's lack ofa constitutional amendment specifically prohibiting the use of public 
funds for religious institutions. Nonetheless, the Law Court was correct to leave 
Maine's tuition reimbursement program and its exclusion ofreligious schools intact. 
Although there may be significant confusion as to where the line will fall between that 
which is permissible and that which is unconstitutional, and as to what criteria will be 
used to make that determination, it was important for the Law Court to articulate that 
Maine's ability to exclude religious organizations from the receipt of public funds falls 
on the "permissible" side of that line. 
Even though the Maine Constitution does not mandate a more strict separation of 
church and state than does the Federal Constitution, the Maine tuition program and the 
issues it entails are more similar to the Locke case than they are to the Zelman case. 
That is, even if the Supreme Court insists on determining complex constitutional 
questions based on extra-constitutional factors such as the economic woes of the 
Cleveland school system, the Law Court did not apply such factors in its assessment 
of Maine's program, and in fact could not do so because of the manner in which the 
Maine tuition program functions. Certainly, many areas of Maine may be experiencing 
economic hardship, thus making it difficult to provide quality primary and secondary 
education. However, this is not the basis for Maine's tuition program. Under Maine's 
187. Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to Turn After Federal Challenges 
to Blaine Amendments Fail, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 213, 221 ("(T]hose that hope to 
establish tuition voucher programs ... suggest that the '(state constitutional amendments] are vulnerable 
to challenge under the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause ... because of their discrimination 
against religious families .... "' (quoting Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just the Beginning: School 
Choice and the Coming Battle over Blaine Amendments 12, The Federalist Society White Papers, available 
at http://blaineamendments.org/scholarship/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007))). 
Voucher advocates also "argue[] that these state constitutional provisions fail the neutrality test set forth 
by the Supreme Court .... " Id. Alternatively, voucher advocates argue that such provisions "run[] afoul 
of the Free Exercise Clause because the clause protects against 'covert suppression of particular religious 
beliefs."' Id. at 221-22 (quoting Briefof Amicus Curiae Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, State ex rel. 
Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274 (Wash. 2002) (No. 68565-7)). 
188. Justice White, for example, has described Establishment Clause jurisprudence as "sacrificing[ing] 
clarity and predictability for flexibility." Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 
646, 662 (1980). 
189. Lantta, supra note 187, at 241. Lantta notes that "states like Maine ... that based their denial of 
funds to religious schools on interpretations of the Federal Establishment Clause are again open to 
challenge." Id. 
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program, families are not eligible for state education funds because they opt to send 
their children to schools other than those which are offered; rather, Maine families 
receive state funds precisely because there are no educational options offered at all by 
the government in their communities. This removed one of the major supporting 
factors in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Zelman opinion. 
If the Locke Court had been governed only by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, 190 it might (although it should not) have found that allowing the use of 
public funds to pursue a degree in theology did not violate the Establishment Clause, 
but that denying such benefit violated the Free Exercise Clause. However, by also 
examining the Washington Constitution's text pertaining to religion, the Court decided 
that, while the scholarship program could have awarded Mr. Davey a scholarship 
without running afoul of the Establishment Clause, it was also free to deny him the 
same funding without reaching the point of violating the Free Exercise Clause. 191 This, 
then, implies that Establishment Clause rights will vary from state to state. It also 
leaves open the question of how the Court would approach state statutory, rather than 
state constitutional, action denying funds to religious schools. 
Because Maine's exclusion of sectarian schools from its tuition program is one of 
these statutory, rather than constitutional, state actions, it falls into that category left 
unsettled by the Supreme Court. Still, the Law Court correctly upheld the Maine 
tuition reimbursement program. 192 States should be allowed to withhold funding for 
religious education, not only because state constitutional provisions or statutes so 
require, but because the U.S. Constitution so requires. 193 Indeed, the Law Court had 
voiced agreement with this principle even before Anderson in Bagley. 194 The Supreme 
Court misinterpreted and weakened the Establishment Clause in Zelman, but the Law 
Court refused to extend those flaws to the novel fact pattern involved in the Maine 
tuition program. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has, unfortunately, eroded the strength of the 
Establishment Clause over the past several decades. A majority of the Justices have 
overlooked the important rationales behind the Establishment Clause: both that of 
according respect to the beliefs of all U.S. citizens by not providing governmental 
support to religious faiths, 195 and that of"protecting the Nation's social fabric from 
190. The First Amendment states, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
191. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) ("(T]here is no doubt that the State could, consistent 
with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology .... The 
question before us, however, is whether Washington ... can deny them such funding without violating the 
Free Exercise Clause." (footnote and citations omitted)). 
192. Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, 'If 61,895 A.2d 944,961, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 661 
(2006). 
193. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion .... " 
( emphasis added)). 
I 94. See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 1999 ME 60, 'If 22, 728 A.2d 127, 135 ("[T]he Establishment 
Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion and from forcing religion, even in 
subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it."). 
195. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 43 I (I 962)(''The history of governmentally established religion, 
both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with ... religion, 
the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who 
held contrary beliefs."). 
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religious conflict. " 196 It is frighteningly rare indeed, today, for the Court to be mindful 
of the fact that "[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible and predominant 
purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of 
official religious neutrality .... " 197 
Accordingly, because Maine's exclusion of religious schools from its tuition 
program is based in a statute rather than in the state constitution, the program as it is 
currently formulated was seen by the Anderson plaintiffs as vulnerable to constitutional 
attack. However, the Law Court confirmed that Maine's program, in actuality, does 
not violate the U.S. Constitution. In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has been 
so erratic with its Religion Clause cases and that it has allowed the Establishment 
Clause to be eviscerated, the Law Court was wise to uphold Maine's antiestablishment 
interests in not diverting public funds to religious schools. 
To further protect Maine's antiestablishment interests against future attack, the 
Maine legislature should also propose a state constitutional amendment clarifying the 
manner in which the Establishment Clause shall be interpreted in this state. Maine is 
one of a very small minority of states without an explicit constitutional provision 
regarding the impermissibility of giving public funds to religious institutions. 198 If 
Zelman 's weakening of the Federal Establishment Clause is allowed to stand, the 
prohibition against this kind of funding in Maine is purely statutory. If it remains so, 
the program's exclusion of religious schools commands less deference from other 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. However, if the exclusion were embodied 
in a state constitutional amendment, it would carry more force, and proponents of the 
program would more easily be able to argue similarities to Locke and Bush, both of 
which involved state constitutional provisions against aid to religious institutions. 
Maine should not need to amend its constitution in order to pursue appropriate 
antiestablishment interests; the Federal Establishment Clause should have been up to 
the task. However, the Zelman opinion was decided incorrectly and is "profoundly 
at odds with the Constitution." 199 The Court overlooked important constitutional 
principles in arriving at the conclusion that Ohio's voucher program was constitutional. 
If the Establishment Clause no longer ensures that the government will not offend non-
adherents' freedom of conscience, and that religion itself will not be invaded by 
government, of what value is it?200 Truly, as Justice Stevens asserted, "[ w ]hen ever we 
remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, 
we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy. "201 
196. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
197. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)(upholding injunction ordering the removal 
of the Ten Commandments from courthouses). 
198. Currently, thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions that expressly prohibit government aid 
to religious institutions. See Blaine Amendments.org, http:/ /www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
199. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
200. See id. at 7 I I {"It is virtually superfluous to point out that every objective underlying the 
prohibition of religious establishment is betrayed by this scheme, but something has to be said about the 
enormity of the violation."). 
20 I. Id. at 686 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
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The Court was correct in 194 7 when it "inaugurated the modem era of 
establishment doctrine" 202 with the Everson case: "No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. "203 None 
of the Justices dissented from this principle in 1947, it has not been overturned, and it 
remains good, albeit woefully weakened, law today. 204 The fact that today's Court sees 
fit to continue to erode this important constitutional principle, without relying on other 
valid theories, is truly an insult to constitutional principles. 205 The Court's education 
funding analysis has erroneously expanded the concept of"play in the joints" nearly 
to the point of absurdity, pushing back further and further the line of permissibility 
under the Establishment Clause. Gone are the days of a vigorous interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause; under Zelman, even the use of public funds to support religious 
education will be considered permissible. Under Locke, it appears, states will be left 
to provide limitations on such potential Establishment Clause violations. In states that 
choose not to do so, the force of the Establishment Clause will be lost in the vast 
expanse that now exists in the joints between it and the Free Exercise Clause. 
202. Id. at 686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
203. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
204. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court has never in so many words 
repudiated this statement, let alone ... overruled Everson."). 
205. Justice Souter asserted, "It is ... only by ignoring the meaning of neutrality and private choice 
themselves that the majority can even pretend to rest today's decision on those [principles]." Id. at 688. 
Justice Souter elaborated, "Although it has taken half a century since Everson to reach the majority's twin 
standards of neutrality and free choice, the facts show that, in the majority's hands, even these criteria 
cannot convincingly legitimize the Ohio scheme." Id. at 695-96. 
